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Abstract 
Although scholars converge on the importance of religion in Balkan politics, they 
disagree on its exact role. Based on the activities of some religious groups in 
countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, some observers consider religion to have a 
divisive and centrifugal effect on the Balkan people. Another line of argument, 
however, states that religious actors can help prevent or mitigate conflicts in the 
region. Although further research is necessary for conclusive remarks, this study 
argues that both sides have validating points to their claims. Data from World 
Values Survey and other available research on the region affirm the general stance 
that religion constitutes a significant factor in the lives of Balkan people and 
politics, and cannot be easily dismissed as irrelevant. The importance attributed to 
religious institutions and leaders also make them likely candidates for promoting 
peace in the region. Whether religious leaders and institutions have used their full 
potential to date or not, however, remain questionable, and needs explanation. 
Given the complex effect that religion seems to have on Balkan politics, and its 
rising importance as an explanatory variable in the contemporary IR literature, it is 
likely to retain its focal position in Balkan studies for the foreseeable future.  
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Introduction 
Religion as an explanatory variable has found an increasingly interested audience in 
the international relations literature in recent years (Hatzopoulos and Petito 2003; 
Pettman 2004; Thomas 2005).The rising interest in religion as an explanatory 
variable has also brought the linkage between religion and peace on the table. For 
instance, based on dataprovided by Minorities at Risk dataset compiled byTed 
Robert Gurr et al, Fox and Sandler (2004: 65-8) argue that religious differences can 
play a key role in the decisions for international political interventions.  
Furthermore, unlike earlier literature on religion, which tended to link it with 
extremism and violence, recent studies question this assumption. According to 
Cavanaugh (2009: 3), “the ‘myth of religious violence’ is the idea that religion is a 
transhistorical and transcultural feature of human life, essentially distinct from 
“secular” features such as politics and economics, which has a peculiarly dangerous 
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inclination to promote violence.” Therefore, Cavanaugh argues that separating 
human activities, such as politics into categories, such as ‘secular’ is artificial, and 
cannot be justified through research (ibid.)  
Meanwhile, some authorsdiscuss the possibility of promoting peace in conflict 
prone regions through religious actors and institutions. While discussing the 
positive impact of religion on peace, Little and Appleby (2004: 5) describe what 
they refer to as “religious peacebuilding” as follows: 
we use the term religious peacebuilding to describe the range of activities 
performed by religious actors and institutions for the purpose of resolving and 
transforming deadly conflict, with the goal of building social relations and political 
institutions characterized by an ethos of tolerance and nonviolence [emphasis 
original]. 
 
Long before it has become a hotly debated item in the IR literature, religion as a 
variable has also played a pivotal role in the history of Balkan politics, where 
scholars often use it interchangibly with ethnicity for individual and group 
identification. As Abu Nimer and Kadayifci-Orellana (2008: 562) point out, 
regardless of the cause of conflict, religious traditions and myths have often been 
abused for use in stereotyping and dehumanizing the “other” . . . As a result, 
religion, and in the case of Muslims, Islam, becomes an important aspect of conflict 
generation as well as conflict resolution and peace building in the region. 
In fact, while discussing its role in Balkan politics, in order to underline its 
importance, some observersgo so far as to claim that “the real future shaping force 
in the Balkans . . . will not be ethnicity but religion (Deliso 2007: xii).”  
Althoughscholarsworking on the Balkans converge on the overall importance of 
religion in the region, they remain divided on its exact role.123During 1990s, while 
the Balkanswere torn apart by bloody conflicts like the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo, primordialist debates stressed ethno-religious 
differences as a major underlying cause. Similarly, functionalist arguments raised 
during the same years approached religion as a tool conveniently used by 
conflicting sides to further their goals (Kaplan 1993; Zimmerman 1996). 
In later years, based on the activities of some extremist and/or externally funded 
religious groups in the region, some observers have come to regard religion to have 
a divisive and centrifugal effect on the Balkan people.Another line of argument, 
however, argues that religious actors can help prevent or mitigate conflicts in the 
Balkans. Proponents of this viewpoint stress that the proximity of local religious 
actors to public and their intimate knowledge of their everyday needs make them 
ideal for knitting closer ties between estranged communities. Although further 
research is necessary for conclusive remarks, this study seeks to underline that both 
sides seem to have validating points to their claims. It also argues that while the 
                                                          
123 On the role of churches in politics of former Yugoslavia, see Palmer (2000). 
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possibility of reaching long-term peace in the Balkans through the help of religious 
actors is real, some of the factors that would make it possible seem to be currently 
missing. 
 
Religion And Balkan People: Some Figures from World Values Survey 
Prior to discussing the capabilities and limits of religion as an independent variable 
on Balkan politics, it is worthwhile to consider the perceptions of the Balkan people 
on the matter. Data from World Values Survey (WVS) and other available research 
on the region affirm the general stance that religion constitutes a significant factor 
in the lives of Balkan people and politics. For instance, according to the WVS data, 
a total of 40% of the Balkan people consider religion as “very important,” in their 
lives, which is followed by 28% of people, who regard religion to be a “rather 
important” factor (see Table 3). 
Meanwhile, it is important to note that the importance attributed to a religion in the 
Balkans may not be a sign of religiosity and/or religious observance on the part of 
an individual. In a study on Bulgaria, for instance, Broun (2007: 108) points out that 
less than 2 percent of young people in the 18-29 age range prayed on a regular 
basis, regardless of their religious affiliation (i.e., of Muslim or Orthodox 
background). 
A simple overview of the relationship between religion and Balkan politics in 
figures also offer interesting results. Once again, according to the WVS data, a 
considerable amount of people in Balkans, such as Croatia, Romania or Turkey 
seem to be convinced that “churches”(religious institutions)“absolutely” influence 
national politics (See Table 1). Balkan people also express more confidence in their 
religious institutions than in their parliaments: an average of 26% of the people 
there has stated that they have “a great deal of confidence” and 34.1% of them have 
“quite a lot of confidence” in religious institutions. Meanwhile, only 8.2% of the 
same people seem to have “a great deal of confidence” and 44.5% of them have 
“quite a lot of confidence” in their parliaments (see Table 4 and Table 5). In the 
same vein, an average of 3.9% of Balkan people seems to have “a great deal of 
confidence” and 19.3% of them have “quite a lot of confidence” in political parties 
(Table 6).In comparison, Table 6 also suggests that 42.7% of the people have 
explicitly stated that they “do not have very much confidence” and 34.1% of them 
“do not have any confidence” in political parties. 
The WVS data also offer interesting glimpses on the tolerance level of Balkan 
people toward people of different religious faith. When asked about their 
preferences concerning neighbors, an average of 27% of them hasresponded that 
they would not like to live with neighbors with a different religious faith (Table 7). 
The worldwide average for this question in the WVS data is 17.8%.Interestingly, 
and somewhat in tandem with these findings, in countries like Bulgaria, some 
authors also explain the peaceful coexistence of different religious groups like 
Orthodox people and Muslims with “the fact that on the whole they still live apart” 
(Broun 2007: 106). 
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Peace Through Inter-Religious Dialogue 
The importance attributed to religious institutions and leaders as shown in WVS 
data further reinforce the argument, which assumes them to play a beneficial role in 
promoting peace in the region. According to Abu Nimer and Kadayifci-Orellana 
(2008: 567), religious actors, particularly local Muslim clerics are respected in their 
respective communities in the Balkans, and can play a significant role in 
establishing ties between estranged ethno-religious groups in conflicted lands. 
These authors further argue that their local communities consider these religious 
leaders to be able “to rehumanize the ‘other,’” since the locals perceive them as 
closer to their community and thus, as more capable to address their daily concerns 
than another figure (ibid). Similarly, Clark (2010: 674) underlines the greater 
credibility of local religious leaders in their respective groups in countries like 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where political leaders are regarded as far more corrupt. 
According tothis viewpoint,  
religious actors are to some extent not merely the guardians of their nation’s 
religious identity, but also of its national identity . . . Religion, therefore, is about 
something much deeper than spirituality alone. Hence religious actors . . . are 
theoretically well equipped to reach people and to thereby gain their trust (Clark 
2010: 674). 
While discussing the inter-religious relations in Bulgaria, Broun (2007: 123) 
stresses that “at local level, relations between Orthodox and Muslims are often 
cordial.” Broun also gives some examples on how local religious communities have 
helped each other to help repair their churches or mosques, or help overcome intra-
communal conflicts (ibid). 
The positive impact of inter-religious dialogue on preventing violent conflict is 
already observable in certain parts of the Balkans. For instance, in Macedonia, 
along with political measures, Mojzes (2008: 413) accounts the co-operation of the 
leaders of main religious groups as significant in preventing the country from 
falling into the clutches of a bloody civil war. While political negotiations and 
external actors were the outstanding factors in ending the conflict, the author argues 
that the atmosphere of dialogue maintained by the major religious leaders have 
enabled conflicting parties to trust each other (ibid). 
Similarly, Johnston and Eastvold (2004:230-231) mention the efforts of an 
international organization, named as The World Conference of Religions for Peace 
along withseveral other international donors to bring together the religious actors 
representing the major religious groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton 
agreement to build a common moral understanding between communities. While 
the resulting collaboration has faced some serious difficulties in taking the initial 
steps further, the authors state that it has nonetheless received a lot of praise 
(Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 231). 
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Limits of Religious Cooperation 
Contrary to the viewpoint that inter-religious dialogue can promote peace in the 
Balkans, pessimists question its significance.Drawing on the example of the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, they point out that religious authorities had almost no 
influence in ending that conflict (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 229). Among other 
factors, those that doubt the impact of religion on peacebuilding also further draw 
out the potential pitfalls of religious extremism, including its potential to segregate 
communities living together. Similar to the essentialist arguments that associated 
religions like Islam with violence in earlier years; religious groups established 
and/or funded by external actors in the Balkans are oftensuspected to have ties with 
terrorism, or condone violence.124 While discussing radical Islamist groups in the 
Balkans, a proponent of this view argues that [f]or the Islamists, the desirable future 
political order is not one of cozy nationstates, but rather a religious commonwealth, 
a sort of revived Ottoman Empire distinguished by Saudi mosques, Afghan clothes, 
and fundamentalist mores . . . [I]t is highly likely that, because of their activities, the 
Balkans will increasingly come to be identified as a spawning ground for terrorists, 
dotted with no-go areas and concealed urban command centers, together comprising 
a series of interconnected nodal points in a global network of terrorist and 
fundamentalist organizations (Deliso 2007: xii). 
Anotherpoint raised by the critics is the incapability or unwillingness of the 
religious actors in the region to take the initiative and try to find solutions to the 
existing problems on their own (Mojzes 2008: 412). While foreign actors have 
encouraged different ethnic communities to meet in common settings like 
international conferences to create rapport, not much base seems to be covered in 
such meetings, and that there is little hope that these steps can lead into more 
concrete actions (Mojzes 2007: 416). In fact, authors like Johnston and Eastvold 
(2004: 232) have gone as far as to claim that “[i]n looking ahead even further, it is 
important to recognize that moves by the West to bring all the religious factions 
together to smooth over their differences, as a prerequisite to restoring multiethnic 
harmony, are unlikely to succeed.” 
The problem is, despite the positive contributions of religious leaders in some cases, 
such as those mentioned earlier,they have failed to use their credibility in public to 
take more decisive steps that lead to longer lasting results in regional peace.Put 
differently, the critics of religious actors argue that they simply have not done as 
much as they should to promote peace in the region. For instance, in places like 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where reconciliation is still much needed, they point out 
that religious actors have eschewed taking serious steps to acknowledge any 
wartime atrocities committed by their respective group, which is considered by 
many as a vital initial step. To make things worse, some of the clerics have even 
                                                          
124E.g. Nidzara Ahmetasevic “Investigation: Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia,” 
http://birn.eu.com/en/75/10/2490/(accessed on 22 October 2012). 
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adopted extremist stances, which further drive conflicting groups apart (Clark 2010: 
676).  
On the one hand, some steps were taken in recent years to promote inter-faith 
cooperation through multi-religious meetings, such as those conducted with 
Orthodox and Muslim actors in different parts of the Balkans. On the other hand, 
pessimistic observers have dismissed such attempts as shallow, and unable to propel 
the participating actors into taking concrete steps for further cooperation. Mojzes 
(2007: 416) explains this failure with the following observation:“The main reasons 
for this are the lack of visionary leadership and of a critical mass of educated 
religious leaders, as well as the inertia that is the result of centuries of suspicion, 
hatred, wars and oppression.” 
Another potential roadblock facing the efforts of the religious actors is the 
heterogeneous composition of the communities they are addressing. Due to 
historical reasons, religious groups like Muslims in the Balkans do not have a united 
religious identity. In fact, Islam in the Balkans is hardly a homogenous entity 
(Babuna 2004: 287-288). Countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, 
“exhibits a patchwork of micro micro-identities that are far from homogeneous and 
cannot be aggregated into simple categories” (Sarajlic 2011: 174). Meanwhile, in 
countries like Bulgaria, Islam “is highly diversified both ethnically (it includes 
Turks, Pomaks, Roma and Tatars) and religiously (the Turkish Muslims are divided 
into Sunnis and Shiites)” (Merdjanova 2006: 5).Often, Muslims from different 
regions within the same country are biased toward each other on various cultural or 
other differences (Broun 2007: 108).Therefore, as Oktem (2011: 157) underlines, 
“[f]or Muslims in the Balkans, ‘being Muslim’ means different things in different 
places at different times.”Adding further complexity to the picture is the fact that 
Muslims in the Balkans do not share the same language, which makes intra-
religious cooperation across borders more difficult, and can exacerbate inter-ethnic 
conflicts (Oktem 2011: 160). One of the consequences of the internal fragmentation 
of major religious communities is the increased tendency to encounter intra-
religious conflicts, along with inter-religious rivalry (Bougarel 2007: 97; Mojzes 
2007: 55).Numerous divisions within major religious communities in countries like 
Bosnia and Herzegovina also increases the difficulty of establishing a steady and 
fruitful inter-religious dialogue. The fact that the religious leaders are unable to 
speak for the whole community affects their credibility—another crucial factor in 
using religion for peacebuilding. For instance, an administrative unit called the 
Islamic Community formally represents the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and is in charge of the religious schools and mosques, and other similar units. 
However, its authority and capacity is often challenged by the other Islamic players 
in the country (Sarajlic 2011: 177). In post-communist Bulgaria, Merdjanova (2006: 
9) similarly points out that the Muslim population have experienced conflict amidst 
its ranks to pick the Chief Mufti. Merdjanova (2006:9) explains that“[t]he severe 
contest over the post of the Chief Mufti has led to the establishment of rival Muslim 
councils, selecting rival chief muftis, and subsequent lawsuits, accompanied by 
mutual accusations and bitter fights in the media.” 
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As a result, notwithstanding the tendency to portray all external Islamic actors as a 
monolithic bloc in popular media, there is little evidence that they act together, or 
even pursue similar goals. Rather, as Mandaville (2010: 8) states, “contemporary 
forms of Muslim transnational solidarity express a diverse range of political and 
normative agendas, and only rarely and in the most extreme cases articulate a vision 
of the umma as a political unit.” 
Another problem associated with the heterogeneity of major religious groups like 
Muslims in the Balkans is security. Detailed works, such as the one undertaken by 
Tziampiris (2009), which explores the nature and depth of the threat from religious 
terrorists in certain countries, such as Bosnia nad Herzegovina already exist. While 
discussing the impact of religious groups established and/or funded by international 
actors and their impact on Balkan security, Nazarko (2007: 15) claims that they are 
poorly controlled by the governments in countries where they operate, thus making 
them pervious to infiltration of religious extremists, including terrorists.125 
Nevertheless, authors challenging this view argue that the link between religious 
groups/networks and the possibility of increasing levels of religious terrorism in the 
region is probably exaggerated (Oktem 2011: 156). 
 
Inter-Religious Dialogue And External Actors 
After the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the fall of communism in the region, the 
following turbulent years have also witnessed the increasing influence of external 
actors on religious affairs. As Sarajlic (2001: 174) has put it, “[t]he vacuum that was 
created by the breakdown of the entire social fabric in the region was filled with 
activities of external actors and their local proxies.”As stated earlier in this study, 
external actors have also sought to create inter-ethnic and inter-religious peace by 
supporting the gathering of religious leaders of major religious communities in the 
region. 
For Balkan Muslims, one of the external actors influencing religious actors and 
forming new networks is Turkey, which operates both through state institutions, 
such as the Presidency of Religious Affairs and Turkish Development and 
Cooperation Agency (TIKA), and socio-religious non-state networks like the Gulen 
movement, which originated in Turkey (Oktem 2011: 160). Along with Turkey, 
Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran have also have remained active 
in the creation of religious networks. While earlier religious networks often 
concentrated on providing relief to war struck areas places like Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, along with proselytizing their version of Islamic teachings, recent 
years have witnessed the increased involvement of religious networks into politics 
on both domestic and international level (Sarajlic 2011: 174). 
Islamic networks with ties with the external actors not only seek to influence the 
Muslim population in religious matters, but also seek to play a role in the foreign 
                                                          
125 See also Broun(2007) for a detailed discussion of similar concerns among Muslims in Bulgaria. 
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policies of their respective countries. Sarajlic (2001: 174) goes further and claims 
that in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina, “the state ceased to be the sole player in 
the realm of foreign policy.” This condition, in return, has increased the stakes for 
all players involved. 
While international actors have played a definitive role in stopping violent conflicts 
in the Balkans, they also seem to have inadvertently propelled intra-religious 
rivalry. For instance, an important factor fuelling the rivalry between the Bosnian 
Muslim activist groups is the diminishing international funding that was formerly 
available to the community through the international Islamic players. (Sarajlic 2011: 
177).Furthermore, external religious actors sharing the same faith also frequently 
end up competing with each other to expand/control their existing networks, thus 
carrying religious rivalry on an international level. 
Independent of any history of conflicts between different religious groups, external 
factors can furtherexacerbate the widening rift within and between the religious 
congregations. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, Muslims remain divided 
between the Middle Eastern oriented and more conservative interpretations of 
Islam, and its liberal interpretations represented by the Turkish and European 
Muslim networks.126To summarize it briefly “The arrival of many other Islamic 
players, belonging to other schools of thought and practice within Islam, has 
brought these in conflict with the local Islamic practices and produced conflicts 
along the interpretative dimension of Islam in Bosnia . . . Essentially, it is a matter 
of a particular ideological vision outlining the orthodoxy and orthopraxis of Islam in 
Bosnia (Sarajlic 2011: 176-177). 
Internal fragmentation may not be unique to the Balkan Muslims, either. Following 
the end of communism, the Orthodox Christians have also experienced a split 
among their ranks between theirByzantinian/Russian and Central European 
religious tradition and teachings. According to Merdjanova (2006:3), in countries 
like Bulgaria in particular, this condition has caught the Orthodox Church 
unrehearsed. Aside from its theological or sociological implications, such splits can 
have important consequences on long-term peace prospects in the region. In fact, 
some observers consider the consequences of picking conservative or extremist 
traditions on both sides as a recipe for disaster. For instance, Mojzes (2008: 417) 
claims that “[i]f the Middle Eastern orientation among the Muslims and Eastern 
orientation among the Orthodox prevails, the clash of these two civilisations would 
seem to be inescapable.” Meanwhile, as discussed earlier, external interference of 
any form to help solve the issue may further complicate the existing picture.  
 
Conclusion 
Unlike in international relations, where it has only recently attracted the interest of 
scholars, religion has always remained a prominent variable for scholars studying 
                                                          
126 For similar problems and conditions in Bulgaria, see Broun (2007). 
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Balkan politics. A perfunctory overview of the role that religious leaders have 
played in promoting inter-communal peace in the region raises hope for them to 
play a meaningful role in furthering dialogue between groups. However, as this 
study has tried to outline in further detail, there are also serious impediments against 
their taking solid steps for long-lasting results. Nonetheless, given the role religion 
has played in other multiethnic or conflict prone parts of the world in recent years, 
there is reason for cautious optimism for the positive role that religious actors can 
play in the Balkans in the foreseeable future. As things stand, however, the current 
efforts for peacebuilding through inter-religious cooperation particularly in conflict 
prone settings are more likely to succeed in some parts of Balkans, such as Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Macedionia than others, such as Kosovo (Mojzes 2007: 412). 
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Appendix 
Table 1: The impact of religious institutions on national politics127 
 
Country/region 
 
Total Croatia Romania Turkey 
Church(es) influence on national 
politics 
Yes, absolutely 19.9 % 12.0 % 15.8 % 29.5 % 
Yes, think so 41.9 % 57.3 % 37.7 % 32.9 % 
No, I don´t think 
they have 26.3 % 26.4 % 28.9 % 24.2 % 
No, absolutely not 11.9 % 4.3 % 17.5 % 13.3 % 
Total 2929 
(100%) 
896 
(100%) 
906 
(100%) 
1127 
(100%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
127Unless otherwise stated, all of the tables in this section are constructed from data from World 
Values Survey collected from the following Balkan countries in indicated years: Albania [1998], 
Albania [2002], Bosnia and Herzegovina [1998], Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001], Bulgaria [1990], 
Bulgaria [1997], Bulgaria [1999], Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Greece [1999], Macedonia [1998], 
Macedonia [2001], Montenegro [1996], Montenegro [2001], Romania [1993], Romania [1998], 
Romania [1999], Serbia [1996], Serbia [2001], Slovenia [1992], Slovenia [1995], Slovenia [1999], 
Turkey [1990], Turkey [1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001]. Since WVS is global in scale, only 
available Balkan countries in that survey are selected for the scope of this study. Data collected in 
various waves of WVS are subject to various limitations and shortcomings, which are discussed in 
detail on their website. As such, the findings presented here should be taken as preliminary, rather than 
conclusive in nature. Table based on data from Values Survey Databank, which comprises data 
collected from the following Balkan countries in indicated years : Albania [1998], Albania [2002], 
Bosnia and Herzegovina [1998], Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001], Bulgaria [1990], Bulgaria [1997], 
Bulgaria [1999], Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Greece [1999], Macedonia [1998], Macedonia [2001], 
Montenegro [1996], Montenegro [2001], Romania [1993], Romania [1998], Romania [1999], Serbia 
[1996], Serbia [2001], Slovenia [1992], Slovenia [1995], Slovenia [1999], Turkey [1990], Turkey 
[1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001] .    
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Table 2: Religious Institutions and Government Policy128: 
 
Country/region 
 
Total Bulgaria Romania Slovenia 
Churches speak out on: 
government policy 
No 74.2 % 59.8 % 79.6 % 81.8 % 
Yes 25.8 % 40.2 % 20.4 % 18.2 % 
Total 2708 
(100%) 836 (100%) 1010 (100%) 862 (100%) 
 
Table 3: The Importance of Religion for Balkan People 129 
 
Country/region 
 
Total 
Alban
ia 
Bosnia 
and 
Herzegov
ina 
Bulgar
ia 
Croat
ia 
Greec
e 
Roman
ia 
Sloven
ia 
Turke
y 
Macedon
ia, 
Republic 
of 
Serbia 
and 
Montene
gro 
Religio
n 
importa
nt in 
life 
Very 
importa
nt 
40.9 
% 
26.4 
% 34.7 % 
14.6 
% 
25.9 
% 
32.9 
% 43.8 % 
15.4 
% 
78.8 
% 41.7 % 25.0 % 
Rather 
importa
nt 
28.0 
% 
33.6 
% 37.9 % 
24.7 
% 
40.5 
% 
35.4 
% 33.1 % 
25.8 
% 
13.4 
% 30.6 % 37.4 % 
                                                          
128Table based on data from Values Survey Databank, which comprises data collected from the 
following Balkan countries in indicated years: Albania [1998], Albania [2002], Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [1998], Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001], Bulgaria [1990], Bulgaria [1997], Bulgaria 
[1999], Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Greece [1999], Macedonia [1998], Macedonia [2001], 
Montenegro [1996], Montenegro [2001], Romania [1993], Romania [1998], Romania [1999], Serbia 
[1996], Serbia [2001], Slovenia [1992], Slovenia [1995], Slovenia [1999], Turkey [1990], Turkey 
[1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001]. 
129Table based on data from Values Survey Databank, which comprises data collected from the 
following Balkan countries in indicated years : Albania [1998], Albania [2002], Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [1998], Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001], Bulgaria [1990], Bulgaria [1997], Bulgaria 
[1999], Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Greece [1999], Macedonia [1998], Macedonia [2001], 
Montenegro [1996], Montenegro [2001], Romania [1993], Romania [1998], Romania [1999], Serbia 
[1996], Serbia [2001], Slovenia [1992], Slovenia [1995], Slovenia [1999], Turkey [1990], Turkey 
[1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001] .  
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Not 
very 
importa
nt 
20.2 
% 
27.3 
% 18.1 % 
32.4 
% 
23.0 
% 
20.3 
% 17.4 % 
35.2 
% 4.9 % 18.3 % 28.8 % 
Not at 
all 
importa
nt 
10.9 
% 
12.7 
% 9.3 % 
28.3 
% 
10.6 
% 
11.4 
% 5.7 % 
23.6 
% 2.9 % 9.4 % 8.8 % 
Total 3021
8 
(100
%) 
1957 
(100
%) 
2376 
(100%) 
2962 
(100%
) 
2168 
(100
%) 
1124 
(100
%) 
3428 
(100%
) 
2986 
(100%
) 
7525 
(100
%) 
1996 
(100%) 
3697 
(100%) 
 
Table 4: Confidence in Churches in the Balkans130 
 
Country/region 
 
Tota
l 
Alba
nia 
Bosnia 
and 
Herzego
vina 
Bulg
aria 
Croa
tia 
Gree
ce 
Roma
nia 
Slove
nia 
Turk
ey 
Maced
onia, 
Republ
ic of 
Serbia 
and 
Monten
egro 
Confide
nce: 
Church
es 
A 
gre
at 
dea
l 
24.1 
% 
26.0 
% 21.8 % 
15.4 
% 
21.1 
% 
14.8 
% 
43.7 
% 
12.6 
% 
32.5 
% 19.7 % 12.6 % 
Qu
ite 
a 
lot 
33.2 
% 
34.1 
% 39.1 % 
25.3 
% 
39.5 
% 
40.0 
% 
35.0 
% 
24.8 
% 
37.8 
% 19.5 % 33.1 % 
No
t 
ver
26.5 
% 
26.4 
% 29.5 % 
30.8 
% 
29.6 
% 
32.7 
% 
17.4 
% 
38.6 
% 
13.8 
% 37.8 % 35.6 % 
                                                          
130Table based on data from Values Survey Databank, which comprises data collected from the 
following Balkan countries in indicated years : Albania [1998], Albania [2002], Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [1998], Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001], Bulgaria [1990], Bulgaria [1997], Bulgaria 
[1999], Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Greece [1999], Macedonia [1998], Macedonia [2001], 
Montenegro [1996], Montenegro [2001], Romania [1993], Romania [1998], Romania [1999], Serbia 
[1996], Serbia [2001], Slovenia [1992], Slovenia [1995], Slovenia [1999], Turkey [1990], Turkey 
[1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001] . 
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y 
mu
ch 
No
ne 
at 
all 
16.2 
% 
13.5 
% 9.6 % 
28.5 
% 
9.8 
% 
12.6 
% 3.9 % 
24.0 
% 
16.0 
% 23.1 % 18.7 % 
Tot
al 
2983
9 
(100
%) 
1972 
(100
%) 
2348 
(100%) 
2932 
(100
%) 
2147 
(100
%) 
1123 
(100
%) 
3422 
(100
%) 
3011 
(100
%) 
7367 
(100
%) 
1957 
(100%) 
3560 
(100%) 
 
Table 5: Confidence in Parliaments in the Balkans131 
 
Country/region 
 
Tota
l 
Alba
nia 
Bosnia 
and 
Herzego
vina 
Bulg
aria 
Croa
tia 
Gree
ce 
Roma
nia 
Slove
nia 
Turk
ey 
Maced
onia, 
Republ
ic of 
Serbia 
and 
Monten
egro 
Confide
nce: 
Parliam
ent 
A 
gre
at 
dea
l 
8.7 
% 
8.2 
% 7.2 % 
8.9 
% 
7.1 
% 
2.8 
% 3.4 % 5.0 % 
16.6 
% 2.1 % 8.2 % 
Qu
ite 
a 
lot 
26.3 
% 
44.5 
% 31.1 % 
32.0 
% 
25.9 
% 
21.5 
% 
16.4 
% 
23.7 
% 
30.9 
% 9.0 % 22.1 % 
No
t 
ver
y 
37.6 
% 
33.9 
% 46.7 % 
39.9 
% 
49.3 
% 
48.1 
% 
45.0 
% 
51.0 
% 
21.0 
% 37.9 % 37.4 % 
                                                          
131Table based on data from Values Survey Databank, which comprises data collected from the 
following Balkan countries in indicated years : Albania [1998], Albania [2002], Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [1998], Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001], Bulgaria [1990], Bulgaria [1997], Bulgaria 
[1999], Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Greece [1999], Macedonia [1998], Macedonia [2001], 
Montenegro [1996], Montenegro [2001], Romania [1993], Romania [1998], Romania [1999], Serbia 
[1996], Serbia [2001], Slovenia [1992], Slovenia [1995], Slovenia [1999], Turkey [1990], Turkey 
[1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001] . 
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mu
ch 
No
ne 
at 
all 
27.4 
% 
13.4 
% 15.0 % 
19.2 
% 
17.7 
% 
27.6 
% 
35.2 
% 
20.3 
% 
31.5 
% 51.0 % 32.3 % 
Tot
al 
2940
8 
(100
%) 
1894 
(100
%) 
2341 
(100%) 
2936 
(100
%) 
2113 
(100
%) 
1119 
(100
%) 
3329 
(100
%) 
2955 
(100
%) 
7295 
(100
%) 
1971 
(100%) 
3455 
(100%) 
 
Table 6: Confidence in Political Parties in the Balkans132 
 
Country/region 
 
Total 
Alba
nia 
Bosnia 
and 
Herzego
vina 
Bulga
ria 
Croa
tia 
Roma
nia 
Slove
nia 
Turk
ey 
Macedo
nia, 
Republi
c of 
Serbia 
and 
Montene
gro 
Confide
nce: The 
Political 
Parties 
A 
gre
at 
dea
l 
3.9 
% 2.7 % 4.9 % 4.6 % 
3.4 
% 2.2 % 2.2 % 
6.6 
% 1.8 % 1.9 % 
Qui
te a 
lot 
19.3 
% 
23.4 
% 25.6 % 
24.6 
% 
19.0 
% 
11.7 
% 
11.5 
% 
22.6 
% 8.6 % 17.4 % 
Not 
ver
y 
mu
ch 
42.7 
% 
48.1 
% 48.4 % 
44.2 
% 
56.5 
% 
46.4 
% 
50.9 
% 
27.7 
% 44.2 % 48.7 % 
                                                          
132Table based on data from Values Survey Databank, which comprises data collected from the 
following Balkan countries in indicated years : Albania [1998], Albania [2002], Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [1998], Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001], Bulgaria [1990], Bulgaria [1997], Bulgaria 
[1999], Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Greece [1999], Macedonia [1998], Macedonia [2001], 
Montenegro [1996], Montenegro [2001], Romania [1993], Romania [1998], Romania [1999], Serbia 
[1996], Serbia [2001], Slovenia [1992], Slovenia [1995], Slovenia [1999], Turkey [1990], Turkey 
[1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001]. 
                                                             IBAC 2012 vol.1  
 
 
257 
 
No
ne 
at 
all 
34.1 
% 
25.7 
% 21.1 % 
26.6 
% 
21.1 
% 
39.7 
% 
35.4 
% 
43.1 
% 45.4 % 32.0 % 
Tot
al 
1907
2 
(100
%) 
1943 
(100
%) 
2360 
(100%) 
978 
(100
%) 
1124 
(100
%) 
1157 
(100
%) 
965 
(100
%) 
5138 
(100
%) 
1962 
(100%) 
3446 
(100%) 
 
Table 7: Neighbor Preferences in the Balkans—People of A Different Religion133 
 
Country/region 
 
Total 
Albani
a 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovin
a 
Bulgari
a 
Croati
a 
Romani
a 
Sloveni
a 
Turke
y 
Neighbour
s: People 
of a 
different 
religion 
Not 
mentione
d 
73.0 
% 75.0 % 72.4 % 83.3 % 
85.7 
% 69.6 % 77.2 % 
64.9 
% 
Mentione
d 
27.0 
% 25.0 % 27.6 % 16.7 % 
14.3 
% 30.4 % 22.8 % 
35.1 
% 
Total 10114 
(100%
) 
999 
(100%
) 
1200 
(100%) 
1072 
(100%) 
1196 
(100%
) 
1239 
(100%) 
1007 
(100%) 
3401 
(100%
) 
 
                                                          
133Table based on data from Values Survey Databank, which comprises data collected from the 
following Balkan countries in indicated years : Albania [1998], Albania [2002], Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [1998], Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001], Bulgaria [1990], Bulgaria [1997], Bulgaria 
[1999], Croatia [1996], Croatia [1999], Greece [1999], Macedonia [1998], Macedonia [2001], 
Montenegro [1996], Montenegro [2001], Romania [1993], Romania [1998], Romania [1999], Serbia 
[1996], Serbia [2001], Slovenia [1992], Slovenia [1995], Slovenia [1999], Turkey [1990], Turkey 
[1996], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001]. The original question asked in the interviews was: “V39. On 
this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as 
neighbors? (Code an answer for each group):People of a different religion.” 
